![]() ![]() Shattered ambitions, deteriorating security The visits also demonstrate that Moscow is not as isolated as the West would like it to be, and that it’s capable of harming Western interests at a limited cost. A quick succession of visits by the Malian defense and foreign ministers to Moscow in March and May, respectively, underline this. Despite-or actually because of-the Russian military’s difficulties in Ukraine, we should expect a strengthening of Russia’s partnership with Mali. Now, Russia’s low-cost engagement with the junta opens it up to potential concessions for the extraction of Malian mineral wealth and the supply of military gear such as helicopters, both of which would weaken Western influence. ![]() These contractors, widely seen as a shadowy force serving the Kremlin’s interests abroad, have been present in Mali since the end of last year, although in smaller numbers and deploying so far only in areas where European forces are absent or no longer engaged.Įven Russia may have been caught by surprise at how easily the deeply rooted French and European influence in the country crumbled: Simply by seizing local frustrations, building on European missteps, and introducing disinformation into the mix, it was able to harm European interests-and for cheap, without any major military, economic, or political engagement. Facing increasing pressure from the international community, coup leader Colonel Assimi Goïta turned to Wagner to effectively help preserve his grasp on power. ![]() That’s when Moscow, which had not been very visible in Bamako in recent years, stepped in to exploit this gulf between Mali and its European and regional partners. Tensions peaked in early February of this year when the European Union (EU)-following sanctions imposed by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)- leveled similar punishment against five prominent individuals it said were hampering the political transition in Mali. The European withdrawal, announced in mid-February, wasn’t unexpected: After a May 2021 military revolt (Mali’s second coup in just ten months), Bamako’s relations with its neighbors, Paris, and other international partners gradually soured. While all eyes are on the European theater, the competition with Russia is also playing out in the Sahel region-and now Europeans, in close coordination with local governments, need to find the right formula to adapt their presence and avoid leaving a vacuum that could be exploited even more. Whatever the case, Russia-by deploying the notorious Wagner Group mercenary force and leading a vast disinformation campaign-is gaining a strategic foothold against European interests at a critical time for Moscow. France claims it’s leaving in accordance with the previously established plan and will evacuate its last military base in the eastern city of Gao sometime in August. The Malian junta itself is now pushing for a quicker end to French involvement, terminating the bilateral Defense Cooperation Treaty and the framework for hosting the two operations. France was gradually joined by other European countries, and the Sahel region had come to host the largest deployment of European forces abroad-with around eight thousand troops.īut now France and its partners are pulling the cord on Barkhane and the Takuba Task Force, claiming that “the political, operational and legal conditions are no longer met,” referring to the deteriorating relationship with the government in Bamako. Operation Serval stopped the advance and was later transformed into a regional counterterrorism operation, dubbed Barkhane. When Mali’s government saw Tuareg separatists and jihadists storming from the north toward the capital Bamako in 2012, it turned to France-a former colonial power-for help.
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